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I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, the child welfare system in the United States has been
criticized for its shortcomings in the protection of children.' Critics
have attacked the system for failing to intervene and protect children
from abuse and neglect at home,' for placing children in abusive foster
homes,3 and for leaving children in foster care indefinitely.' Today,
with over 500,000 children in foster care nationally,5 most of the criticism focuses on long-term foster care placements. 6 Critics blame numerous factors for such lengthy placements, including an increase in
the number of children entering foster care,' high caseworker
caseloads,8 and a shortage of adequately trained caseworkers.' Regardless of the cause, lengthy foster care placements are harmful to
1. See Karen Dorros & Patricia Dorsey, Whose Rights Are We Protecting,Any-

way?, CHILDREN TODAY, May-June 1989, at 6, 7 (discussing the delay in termination

suits due to the numerous opportunities given to parents to reform), reprinted in PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN 446, 447 (Child Abuse: A Multidisciplinary Survey No.

7, Byrgen Finkelman ed., 1995); Edith Fein & Anthony N. Maluccio, Permanency
Planning:Another Remedy in Jeopardy?, 66 Soc. SERV. REV. 335, 337 (1992) (critiquing the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and its failures), reprinted
in PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN, supra, at 231, 233; Robert L. Geiser, The Shuf-

fled Child and Foster Care, TRIAL, May-June 1974, at 27, 29, 35 (criticizing the system
for failing to rehabilitate families, delaying the adoption of children, and mistreating
foster parents), reprinted in PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN, supra, at 37, 39, 41;

Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for ConstitutionalProtection of Foster
Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 199-201, 204-11
(1988) (discussing the abuse and neglect of children while in foster care), reprinted in
PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN, supra, at 115, 115-17, 120-27.

2. See Dorros & Dorsey, supra note 1, at 447-48.
3. See, e.g., Bogart R. Leashore, Demystifying Legal Guardianship:An Unexplored Option for Dependent Children, 23 J. FAM. L. 391, 396 (1984-1985), reprinted
in PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 95, 100; Mushlin, supra note 1, at

115-16, 120-23.
4. See, e.g., Andre P. Derdeyn et al., Alternatives to Absolute Termination of Parental Rights After Long-Term Foster Care, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1168-69 (1978),
reprinted in PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 49, 52-53; Geiser,

supra note 1, at 39.
5. Youth Across the Nation Team Up for Kids in Foster Care During National
Kids Care Week 2001: An Initiative of the Points of Light Foundation, PR NEWSWIRE,
Oct. 9, 2001, at http://media.prnewswire.com/en/jsp/search.jsp (on file with the Texas

Wesleyan Law Review).
6. See, e.g., Derdeyn et al., supra note 4, at 49, 53; Geiser, supra note 1, at 37, 39,
41.
7. See, e.g., Fein & Maluccio, supra note 1, at 232-33, 235-37; Arlene E. Fried,
The Foster Child's Avenues of Redress: Questions Left Unanswered, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 465, 465 (1993) (attributing the increase partly to drug addiction, alcoholism, and homelessness) (citing Celia W. Dugger, Troubled Children Flood Ill-Prepared Care System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1992, at Al), reprinted in PROTECTING
ABUSED CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 245, 245.

8. See, e.g., Fein & Maluccio, supra note 1, at 239 (citing SHEILA B. KAMERMAN
J. KAHN, SOCIAL SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES IN THE

& ALFRED

UNITED STATES (Annie E. Casey Foundation, 1989)). The Child Welfare League of
America recommends a caseload of twelve cases. TEX. DEP'T OF PROTECTIVE &
REGULATORY SERVS., DESCRIPTION OF CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES PROGRAM, at

http://www.tdprs.state.tx.us/about-prs/state-plan/01descriptionCPS4c.asp
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children: foster care, due to its temporary nature, does not provide
children with the emotional attachments needed for emotional and
physical development.1"
A child's emotional and intellectual abilities are nurtured by family

relationships."1 Thus, a parent's prolonged absence impedes a child's

developmental processes. 2 Foster care typically cannot replace the
emotional nurturing given by a psychological parent1 3 because foster

parents are discouraged from forming emotional attachments to foster

children."4 Neglecting a child's need for emotional bonding leaves a
child without a sense of belonging. 5 While testifying before the

Texas Legislature, one child stated that "the longer you are in [foster]
care, the more you get moved... the more rejected you feel. It makes
you feel that you are not wanted and as if nobody loves you."' 6 Un-

derstandably, children in foster care develop a lack of trust for others,

17
form shallow attachments, and regress in their emotional growth.
In 1997, with over seven thousand Texas children in substitute
care' 8 for more than twenty-four months,' 9 changes were needed in

2001) [hereinafter DESCRIPTION] (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review). In
Texas, a caseworker's caseload average is 23.9 cases. Id.
9. See, e.g., Fein & Maluccio, supra note 1, at 239 (citing SHEILA B. KAMERMAN

& ALFRED J.

KAHN, SOCIAL SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH,AND FAMILIES IN THE

UNITED STATES (Annie

E. Casey Foundation, 1989));

Dorros & Dorsey, supra note 1, at 447.
10. MARK HARDIN & ROBERT LANCOUR,

DESCRIPTION,

supra note 8;

EARLY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL

RIGHTS: DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE STATUTORY GROUNDS

7 (1996). Children need

a "psychological parent" and an uncertain future prevents them from making the
emotional attachments needed for such a relationship. Id.; see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 90 (1996).

GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 8.
12. Id. at 11.
13. See, e.g., Sanford N. Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283,
300-01 (1971), reprinted in PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 17,
34-35. A psychological parent is one who provides for both the child's physical and
emotional growth. HARDIN & LANCOUR, supra note 10, at 7.
14. See Katz, supra note 13, at 35. Foster parents are discouraged from bonding
with foster children because such "placements [are] intended to be temporary." See
id.

11.

15.

GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,

supra note 10, at 15.

16. Hearings on Tex. H.B. 2249 Before the Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence, 77th
Leg., R.S. Tape 1, Side A (May 7, 2001) (testimony of Savannah Matlock, Student)
(tapes on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
17. See id.
18. Substitute care refers to "[c]hildren under PRS' legal responsibility who are
placed outside their home. This includes foster homes, institutions, foster group
homes, [and] adoptive homes .... " TEX. DEP'T OF PROTECTIVE & REGULATORY
SERVS.,
2000 DATA BOOK 162 at http://www.tdprs.state.tx.us/AboutPRS/
PRSDataBooksandAnnualReports/2000toc.asp (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).

19. TEX. SUNSET ADVISORY COMM'N, DEP'T OF PROTECTIVE AND REGULATORY
SERVS., STAFF REPORT 37 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSET]. These statistics were compiled at the end of fiscal year 1995. Id.
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the system to prevent "foster care limbo."2 Foster care limbo refers
to the existence of children who live in foster care for lengthy periods
of time.2 ' Limbo results when a foster care child cannot be safely returned home; yet he or she is not free for adoption because the state
has not terminated the parent-child relationship.22
In hopes of eliminating foster care limbo, the Seventy-Fifth Legislature passed a law2 3 limiting the time in which the Texas Department of
Protective and Regulatory Services (DPRS) 24 can achieve permanency for a child in its care. 2 Texas Family Code section 263.401 limits the time a child can stay in substitute care to twelve months prior
to the court entering a final order.2 6 While this statute and its companion statute 2 7 have been successful in decreasing both the number
of children living in foster care and the length of a child's stay, 28 further improvements in the system are needed. The twelve-month
deadline may not allow sufficient time for parents with drug or alcohol
addictions to comply with their service plans.2 9 In addition, a provision is needed to ensure that cases overturned on appeal and remanded for new trials are resolved in a timely manner.30
20. See Act of May 28, 1997: Hearings on Tex. S.B. 181 Before the Senate Jurisprudence Comm., 75th Leg., R.S. Tape 1, Side B (Mar. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Florence Shapiro) (tapes on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law
Review).
21. See Byrgen Finkelman, Volume Introduction to PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN, supra note 1, at xiv.
22. Id.
23. This law was recommended by the Texas Sunset Advisory Commission and the
Governor's Committee to Promote Adoption. See SUNSET, supra note 19, at 2, 44;
REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE TO PROMOTE ADOPTION 13-14 (1996)
[hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE]. The Supreme Court Task Force on Foster
Care also made similar recommendations. See Act of May 28, 1997: Hearings on Tex.
H.B. 2249 Before the Senate Jurisprudence Comm., 77th Leg., R.S. Tape 2, Side B
(Mar. 13, 2001) (statement of Cynthia Bryant, Member, Texas Supreme Court Task
Force on Foster Care) (tapes on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
24. DPRS is the agency responsible for intervening in familial relationships when
abuse or neglect is alleged. SUNSET, supra note 19, at 167. DPRS is commonly known
in Texas as CPS: child protective services.
25. See Act of May 31, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1022, § 90, sec. 263.401, 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3733, 3764-69, amended by Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090,
§ 8, sec. 263.401, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2395, 2396 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 263.401 (Vernon 2002)).
26. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401. The judge is allowed to extend this
deadline up to 180 days for a total of eighteen months. Hereinafter, "section" refers
to "Texas Family Code Section" unless otherwise noted.
27. See id. § 263.403.
28. Press Release, Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, Governor Bush Highlights Early Success of Texas Adoption Reforms: Adoptions Up,
Waiting Time Down (Dec. 7, 1998), at http://www.tdprs.state.tx.us/AboutPRS/
PRSReleasesandNewsletter/1998_releaseAdoptiondec.asp (Dec. 7, 1998) (on file
with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 250-60.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 262-79.
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The Texas Legislature should make further amendments to Chapter
26331 to allow an additional extension when parents receive inpatient
treatment for substance abuse and implement a deadline for overturned cases remanded on appeal. Part II provides background information helpful in understanding the significance of the mandatory
dismissal deadline. Part III reviews the development of the twelvemonth deadline and discusses the original enactment of section
263.401 and the issues surrounding its interpretation. In Part IV, this
Comment explains and analyzes the recent amendments affecting section 263.401. In conclusion, this Comment acknowledges the success
of the mandatory dismissal date and recommends that more changes
be made for the benefit of Texas foster care children, proposing additional provisions to Chapter 263 of the Texas Family Code.
II.

PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN

The protection of children falls on the shoulders of each individual
state. 32 However, like many other areas of state government, the federal government regulates the child welfare system through its spending power: receipt of federal funding is contingent upon a state's
compliance with federal regulations.3 3 This Part outlines two federal
acts that have had a significant impact on the DPRS's procedures. To
illustrate the importance of the mandatory dismissal deadline, this
Part also outlines the procedural requirements of a DPRS suit from
removal to termination.
A.

The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 198034

Before the passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980 (AACWA), child welfare agencies operated under a philosophy of child rescue.35 Recognizing the severe psychological effect
31. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ch. 263, Review of Placement of Children Under Care

of DPRS (Vernon 2002). Hereinafter, "chapter" refers to "Texas Family Code Chapter" unless noted otherwise.
32. States have authority under the doctrine of parens patriae to intervene in the
parent-child relationship when child abuse and neglect occurs. E.g., Bowen v. Am.
Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627-28 & n.13 (1986); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

911 (7th ed. 1999) (defining parenspatriaeas "parent of his country," and referring to
the role of the state as guardian of persons with legal disabilities); Stacy Robinson,
Comment, Remedying Our Foster Care System: Recognizing Children's Voices, 27
FAM. L.Q. 395, 395 (1993).
33. See Cynthia Bryant & Charles G. Childress, Introductory Comment to JOHN J.
SAMPSON ET AL., SAMPSON & TINDALL'S TEXAS FAMILY CODE ANNOTATED ch. 262
(12th ed. 2002) [hereinafter SAMPSON & TINDALL'S]. Federal sources fund over fifty
percent of DPRS's budget. Federal funding includes Title V-B Child Welfare and
Family Preservation, Title IV-E Foster Care, and Adoption Assistance and Independent Living. SUNSET, supra note 19, at 170.
34. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
35. See Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect
Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 254-55 (discussing the AACWA).
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that termination of the parent-child relationship has on a child, the
AACWA changed this philosophy to family preservation. 6 The
AACWA's objectives included preventing the unnecessary destruction
of families and providing foster children with permanency sooner.37

Another AACWA objective was providing families with services
aimed at resolving their problems, with the goal of returning children
home or preventing removal altogether.3 8 To meet this goal, the
AACWA mandated that case workers use reasonable efforts to maintain the child in the home when the child's welfare was not at risk,39 or
lose federal funding for failure to do so.40 If removal was necessary,

caseworkers were required to use reasonable efforts to enable the safe

return of the child.4 ' Only when these services failed to enable the
safe return of the child were the parental rights terminated.4 2

Despite the potential success of the AACWA, much confusion sur-

rounded the "reasonable efforts" requirement.43 The AACWA failed
to define reasonable efforts, which resulted in courts throughout the
nation interpreting the requirement differently.' Additionally, confusion existed over the ramifications of a judge's finding that a
caseworker failed to make reasonable efforts prior to the removal of a

child .4a

The AACWA's only intended consequence for failing to

make reasonable efforts was that the state would not receive matching
federal funds for the child's foster care placement. 46 However, many
interpreted the AACWA as requiring the return of the child to the

parents when "reasonable efforts" were not made prior to removal.47

Because of the concern over children being returned to dangerous en-

vironments at home, many states enacted "reasonable efforts" provi36. See id. at 255.
37. Robinson, supra note 32, at 399 (citing Barbara Atwell, "A Lost Generation":
The Battle for PrivateEnforcement of the Adoption Assistance & Child Welfare Act of
1980, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 593, 596 (1992)). Another objective of the AACWA was to
provide proper care for children when in the system. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Tracey B. Harding, Involuntary Termination of ParentalRights: Reform Is
Needed, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 895, 911-12 (1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994)).
40. See Shotton, supra note 35, at 227.
41. See Harding, supra note 39, at 912.
42. See id. at 913 (stating that "if a state fails to comply ... the State agency may
decline to initiate ... termination of parental rights").
43. See Katherine A. Hort, Note, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest
of the Child? ASFA's Guidelines for the Termination of ParentalRights, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1879, 1892-93 (2001); see also Shotton, supra note 35, at 225-29.
44. Hort, supra note 43, at 1892-93 (citing Shawn L. Raymond, Note, Where Are
the Reasonable Efforts to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts Requirement?: Monitoring
State Compliance Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1240 (1999)); see Shotton, supra note 35, at 225.
45. See Shotton, supra note 35, at 227.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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sions in their removal and termination statutes.4 8 Some of these
provisions required caseworkers to make reasonable efforts before removing a child from his home.49 Because of these problems and other
external factors, the AACWA failed to reduce the number of children
in foster care.5 °
B.

The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 199751

With the hope of solving problems left unresolved by AACWA,52
Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(ASFA). 53 The ASFA contains three important provisions aimed at
reducing the length of a child's stay in foster care.54 First, states must
terminate parental rights if the child has spent fifteen of the last
twenty-two months in foster care.55 States can avoid termination
under this requirement if the child is in the care of relatives or if termination is not in the child's best interest.56 In addition, the "15/22
provision ' ' 57 does not prevent states from terminating before fifteen
months have elapsed if it is in the best interest of the child.5 8 The
ASFA also establishes a timeframe for states to come into compliance
with its provisions, in regard to children already in foster care at the
time of its enactment.59
Second, under the ASFA, child-welfare agencies are not required to
use reasonable efforts when a "parent has subjected the child to aggravating circumstances,
a parent has committed certain crimes
48. See id. at 227, 234-35. Some of these states require that a finding of "reasonable efforts" be made at every hearing. Id. at 234; see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 5-525(d)(1) (1999) (requiring the agency to make reasonable efforts to reunify the
family before removal); NEV. REV. STAT. 432B.393(1) (2000) (requiring the agency to
make reasonable efforts to maintain the child's family prior to removal); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-7-7(b)(1) (2000) (requiring the agency to make reasonable efforts to encourage the parent-child relationship).
49. See Shotton, supra note 35, at 227; see also, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 262.101-.102 (Vernon 2002).
50. See Hort, supra note 43, at 1891-94. External factors include drug use, teenage pregnancy, AIDS, and homelessness. Id. at 1892 (citing Mary O'Flynn, The
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: Changing Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 243, 244
(1999)).
51. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
52. Hort, supra note 43, at 1893.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i) (Supp. V 1999).
54. See Hort, supra note 43, at 1894-95.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (Supp. V 1999).
56. Id. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(ii).
57. See Hort, supra note 43, at 1881 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 675 cmt. (Construction).
59. Id. § 675 cmt. (Transition Rules; New and Current Foster Children).
60. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (Supp. 2002). Aggravated circumstances include abandonment, torture, sexual abuse, and chronic abuse. Id.
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against another child,6 or the state has involuntarily terminated parental rights to a sibling of the child.6 2 Thus, in these circumstances,
states can move immediately for termination, decreasing the time a
child will spend in foster care.6 3 Concurrent planning for reunification
of the family and termination of the parent-child relationship may also
be undertaken.6 4 Finally, the Act clarifies that "in determining reasonable efforts to be made.., the child's health and safety shall be the
paramount concern. 65
The provisions of the ASFA have led to many procedural changes
in Texas's child welfare system. 66 These changes work toward eliminating foster care limbo by decreasing the lengthy time periods between child removal, parental rights termination, and adoption
placements. 67 By decreasing the time a child is without a permanent
family, the negative psychological effects of foster care are lessened.68
C. ProceduralRequirements from Removal to Termination
DPRS may take possession of a child in three different manners:
pursuant to a court order after a full adversary hearing,6 9 pursuant to
an ex-parte order, 70 or in an emergency without a court order. 71 At a
full adversary hearing,72 the court may grant DPRS's removal request
if it finds that two factors exist: (1) DPRS made reasonable efforts to
prevent the need for removal; and (2) it is contrary to the child's welfare to remain in the home.7 3 If the request is granted, the court must
enter a temporary order to provide for the care of the child.74 Generally, this order will appoint DPRS as the temporary managing conservator of the child,75 and the child will be placed in substitute care. 76
However, the court must place the child with a non-custodial parent,
7 7
relative, or family friend when it is safe to do SO.
61. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii). These crimes are limited to murder, voluntary manslaughter, and felony assault that results in serious bodily injury. Id.
62. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii).
63. See Hort, supra note 43, at 1895.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(F).
65. Id. § 671(a)(15)(A).
66. See Bryant & Childress, Introductory Comment to SAMPSON & TINDALL'S,
supra note 33, ch. 262.
67. See Press Release, supra note 28.
68. See Geiser, supra note 1, at 41.
69. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201 (Vernon 2002).
70. See id. § 262.101.
71. See id. §§ 262.102, .104.
72. If the child has been removed with an ex-parte order or without an order, a
full adversary hearing must be held within fourteen days of the temporary order. See
id. § 262.201.
73. Id. § 262.205.
74. Id.
75. See SUNSET, supra note 19, at 183.
76. DESCRIPTION, supra note 8.
77. Id.
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After DPRS has been appointed temporary managing conservator,
permanency planning begins.7 8 First, DPRS must file a service plan
with the court. This plan identifies whether the permanency goal is
reunification of the child with the parents or termination of parental
rights.7 9 Among other things, the service plan lists the necessary actions that the parents must take for the child to be returned to them.8 °
The next procedural step is the status hearing, 81 at which the court
reviews the service plan 82 and ensures that the parents understand
83
both the plan and the ramifications of failing to comply with it.
Before a child has been in DPRS's custody for six months, a permanency hearing must be held.84 The court evaluates the appropriateness of the child's placement, the parent's compliance with the service
plan,8 and the progress made toward eliminating those factors that
made it necessary to place the child in foster care. 86 The court must
allow the child to return home if it would be both a safe environment
for the child and the best interest of the child.8 7
Courts also consider the best interest of the child during a termination hearing.8 8 An order terminating the parent-child relationship
may only be entered if the fact finder determines that termination is in
the best interest of the child.8 9 When termination is not in the child's
78. See Bryant & Childress, Introductory Comment to SAMPSON & TINDALL'S,
supra note 33, ch. 263. Permanency planning refers to the process of DPRS assisting
the parents in addressing the problems that led to removal and providing the appropriate services to attain permanency for the child. These separate hearings are intended to help DPRS and the court meet the final order deadline of twelve months.
Id.
79. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.101.
80. Id. § 263.102.
81. Id. § 263.201. This hearing must be held not later than sixty days after the
court has been appointed temporary managing conservator of the child. Id.
82. Id. § 263.202(b). The court must make findings on whether the plan adequately ensures that DPRS makes reasonable efforts to enable the parents to provide
a safe environment for the return of the child. Id.
83. Id. Specifically, the court must determine if the parents have been advised
that if they are not able to provide a safe home within the time specified in the plan,
they are at risk of losing "parental and custodial duties and rights" to the child. Id.
84. Id. § 263.304. At least ten days prior to the permanency hearing, DPRS "shall
prepare a permanency plan" and "shall file with the court ... a permanency progress
report." Id. § 263.3025. The plan and report must state whether DPRS recommends
to dismiss the suit or to continue it. Id. §§ 263.3025, .303. Subsequent permanency
hearings will be held within 120 days of the last hearing until a final order is rendered.
See id. § 263.305.
85. See id. § 263.306.
86. Id. § 263.306 cmt.
87. Id. § 263.306.
88. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 5; see also Vanessa L. Warzynski, Comment, Termination of ParentalRights: The "PsychologicalParent" Standard, 39 VILL.
L. REV. 737, 759 (1994).
89. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(2), .003(5). The evidence must prove
by a clear and convincing standard that one of the enumerated grounds for termination exists. See id. § 161.003.
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best interest and it is not safe for the child to return home, DPRS may
be appointed as permanent managing conservator, 90 which places the
child in foster care limbo.9'
III.

EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE FOSTER CARE LIMBO

In 1996, the Texas Sunset Advisory Commission 92 released its report describing its review of DPRS. 93 The report included numerous
recommendations to improve service delivery, "move children into
permanent settings" quickly, and "correct management problems."9 4
In May 1996, Governor George W. Bush signed executive order GWB
96-7 creating the Governor's Committee to Promote Adoption to "determine which [part of the adoption system] ... impede[s] the goal of
timely adoptions."95 This Part will discuss the recommendations made
by the Sunset Commission and Governor's Committee, the statutes
enacted based on them, and the court's analysis of the statutes.
A.

Texas Sunset Advisory Commission Staff Report

At the time of the 1995 study, over 4000 Texas children had been
living in foster care for more than one year. 96 Over half of these children had been in foster care for more than two years. 97 Additionally,
the 1995 statistics reflected that children in foster care experienced an
average of three foster care placements.9 8 The Commission found
that the permanency process lacked deadlines to limit the amount of
time a child could spend under DPRS's conservatorship.9 9 Finding
that lengthy stays in foster care harm children,10 0 the Commission recommended either that the parent-child relationship be terminated or
that the child be reunited with his or her parents within twelve
months.'0 1 Requiring that either the deadline be met or the case be
90. See SAMPSON & TINDALL'S, supra note 33, § 161.205 cmt.
91. Because parental rights have not been terminated, the child cannot be

adopted. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 162.001(b). Unless circumstances change that

allow the child to be returned to a safe home environment, the child will remain in
foster care.
92. The Sunset Advisory Commission is the governmental body responsible for
reviewing state agencies with the purpose of determining whether the state agency is
still needed and what problems need to be addressed. The Commission usually conducts agency reviews every twelve years. However, the review of DPRS was conducted early due to administrative problems that were interfering in service delivery.

See

SUNSET,

supra note 19, at 7.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 1.

95.
96.

supra note 23, at 27-28.
supra note 19, at 39.

GOVERNOR'S COMMIT-FEE,
SUNSET,

97. Id.
98. Id. at 37.
99. Id. at 39.
100. See id. at 38 (finding that lengthy stays increase the possibility of "long-term
psychological problems").
101. See id. at 44.
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dismissed would prevent children from being in "legal limbo" for
years.' 0 2 DPRS also recommended that "[u]nder exceptional circumstances," the court could be empowered to grant an extension if it was
in the best interest of the child. °3
The Commission supported its recommendation of a twelve-month
deadline by examining similar requirements in other states.1 °4 Almost
half of all states had time limits shorter than the federal guideline of
eighteen months. 10 5 In addition to the benefits children would receive
from implementing the deadline, the Commission noted that the state
could also save significant amounts of money in foster care
payments.1 0 6
B.

Governor's Committee to Promote Adoption

Consistent with the Commission's findings, the Governor's Committee found that children were spending years in foster care before
their adoptions were finalized. 10 7 It attributed these delays to inefficiency in the process-from removal of the child, to termination, to
adoption. 8 Accordingly, the Governor's Committee adopted the
Sunset Commission's recommendation of a twelve-month deadline. 01 9
C.

Seventy-Fifth Legislative Session

In 1997, the Texas Legislature enacted several changes based upon
the recommendations of the Sunset Commission and the Governor's
Committee. 110 Intending to reduce the length of time children stay in
foster care,' the legislature enacted the twelve-month deadline in
Texas Family Code section 263.401.2 At that time, the legislature
enacted additional statutes that gave the courts flexibility in meeting
102. See id. at 40.
103. Id. at 44.
104. See id. at 40.
105. See id.
106. See SUNSET, supra note 19, at 45.
107. GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE, supra note 23, at 5-6 (reporting that in fiscal years
1991 through 1995, children spent an average of forty months in foster care before
their adoptions were finalized and that in 1996, over 2300 children were awaiting
adoptions because the parent-child relationship had not yet been terminated).
108. See id. at 13-14.
109. Id. at 19.
110. See Act of May 31, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1022, § 90, secs. 263.401-.403,
1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3733, 3768-70 (amended 2001) (current version at TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 263.401-403 (Vernon 2002)).
111. See Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at Tape 1, Side A (statement of Sen. Florence Shapiro).
112. Act of May 31, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1022, § 90, sec. 263.401, 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3733, 3768 (amended 2001) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 263.401).
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the deadline of section 263.401.113 The legislature then streamlined
the entire process, as described 14in Part IV, to ensure that the twelvemonth deadline could be met.'
1. Original Enactment of Texas Family Code Section 263.401 and
Companion Statutes
Under section 263.401, the court must enter a final order1 15 by "the
first Monday after the first anniversary" of the appointment of DPRS
as temporary managing conservator.1 16 If the court has not entered a
final order by the "first Monday," the suit filed by DPRS must be
dismissed.11 7
However, the twelve-month deadline is not absolute.1 18 The legislature granted the authority to the court to allow an extension of not
longer than 180 days. 119 The court must grant the extension prior to
the twelve-month deadline and only if it is in the best interest of the
child to remain under the DPRS's conservatorship. 12' Additionally,
the court must state the new dismissal date in the extension order and
enter additional temporary orders to ensure the child's safety.1 21 If an
extension order is granted, "[t]he court may not grant an additional
extension," and it must either
dismiss the suit or render a final order
1 22
by the new dismissal date.
The Seventy-Fifth Legislature enacted a statute along with the
twelve-month deadline that enables the court to "test" the parent's
ability to provide a safe environment for the child. 23 Under this stat113. See Act of May 31, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1022, § 90, secs. 263.402-.404,
1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3733, 3769 (amended 2001) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 263.402-.404).
114. See Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 603, §§ 5-12, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws
2119, 2120-23 (codified as amended at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 263.301-.503).
115. The statute defines a "final order" in subsection (d):
(d) For purposes of this section, a final order is an order that:
(1) requires that a child be returned to the child's parent;
(2) names a relative of the child or another person as the child's managing conservator;
(3) without terminating the parent-child relationship, appoints the department as the managing conservator of the child; or
(4) terminates the parent-child relationship and appoints a relative of
the child, another suitable person, or the department as managing
conservator of the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.401(d).

116. Id. § 263.401(a).
117. Id.
118. See id. § 263.401(b).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 263.401(b)(1)-(2).
122. Id. § 263.401(c).
123. Act of May 31, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1022, § 90, sec. 263.402, 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3733, 3769 (amended 2001) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 263.403).
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ute, the court can place the child back in the home without dismissing
the suit. 1 24 In order to return the child home under the authority of
this section, the court must find that retaining jurisdiction is in the best
interest of the child, order that DPRS continue its conservatorship
over the child, and order that DPRS monitor the child's placement. 125
Furthermore, the court must schedule a new
dismissal date not later
1 26
than 180 days from the date of the order.
If DPRS removes the child from the home again prior to the dismissal of the suit or the rendering of a final order, the court must schedule yet another dismissal date. 27 "The new dismissal date may not be
later than the original dismissal date established under section 263.401
or the 180th day after [the child
was removed from the monitored
1' 28
return], whichever date is later.'
In entering a final order, the court has alternatives to terminating
the parent-child relationship or returning the child to his or her parent. 1 29 The court may name a relative of the child or DPRS as the
managing conservator of the child without terminating parental rights
to the child.' 3 ° To name DPRS as conservator, the court must find
that it is not in the best interest of the child to have a parent, relative,
or other individual appointed as managing conservator.'
This finding must be based on a belief that appointing the parent as managing
conservator would "significantly impair" the child's physical and emotional well-being.' 32 Furthermore, additional considerations make
such orders more likely for those children who are turning eighteen in
the next three years, are "twelve years of age or older" and have "expressed a strong desire against termination" or adoption, or have
"special medical and behavioral needs that make adoption" unlikely. 133 These provisions were enacted to ensure that children under
34
the permanent conservatorship of DPRS are not lost in the system.1
2.

Problems in Enforcing the Mandatory Dismissal Deadline

Shortly after the new statutes were enacted, specifically section
263.401, several cases were appealed on mandamus for the court's fail124. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.403. This section allows DPRS to place the child
back in the parents' custody without having to dismiss the petition. DPRS can observe whether the parents have improved and if not, the child can be removed again
without the delay of starting a new petition. See id.
125. Id. § 263.403(a)(3)-(4).
126. Id. § 263.403(b)(2).
127. Id. § 263.403(c).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 263.404.
130. Id. § 263.401.
131. Id. § 263.404.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See SAMPSON & TINDALL'S, supra note 33, § 263.501 cmt.
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ure to comply with the twelve-month deadline.' 3 5 This subsection discusses the appellate court holdings that led to legislative amendments
in 2001.136
On petition for a writ of mandamus, In re Neal' 37 was the first appellate case to address the twelve-month deadline.13 8 The issue before
the court was "whether constructive compliance with section
263.402(a)1 3 9 allowed the court to retain jurisdiction and not dismiss
the suit as mandated under section 263.401. "1 4° The trial court complied with section 263.401(a) and entered an extension order prior to
the "first Monday" deadline; the new dismissal date was set for 180
days later.1 41 However, the trial judge disregarded subsection (b) and
entered another extension order with a dismissal date beyond the previous dismissal date. 4 2
DPRS argued that de facto compliance with section 263.402(a) allowed the court's second extension. 43 According to DPRS, court approval of the children's return to their mother under section
263.004(a) 14 4 constituted a temporary order under section 263.402.141
"Under their argument, the new dismissal date would have been the
later of the original dismissal date or the 180th day after the date the
children were removed from their home a second time.' 14 6 The appellate court was not convinced,' 47 holding that section 263.004 was
not intended to serve as a third basis for an extension under section
263.401.148 The court explained that sections 263.401 and 263.402
were enacted in 1997. Had the legislature intended that section
263.004, which was enacted in 1995, serve as an extension to the
mandatory dismissal, the legislature would have amended it in 1997.'49
Furthermore, the court reasoned that interpreting section 263.004 as
such an extension would "render meaningless the deadlines of sections 263.401(a) and (b) and 263.402(b)(2) and the findings require135. See infra text accompanying notes 137-85.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 187-245.
137. 4 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding).
138. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401 (Vernon 2002).
139. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.402(a).
140. Neal, 4 S.W.3d at 444.
141. Id. at 446.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Act of April 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, sec. 263.004, 1995 Tex. Gen.
Laws 113, 270, repealed by Act of May 26, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1150, § 31, 1999
Tex. Gen. Laws 4043, 4049.
145. See Neal, 4 S.W.3d at 446.
146. Id. at 446 n.7.
147. See id. at 446-47.
148. Id. at 447.
149. Id.
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ments of section 263.402(b)(1)." 15 ° Thus, the court conditionally
granted the writ of mandamus. 5 1
The Waco Court of Appeals decided several issues regarding the
mandatory dismissal date in In re Bishop. 52 The court held that a
temporary order under section 263.402 could only be rendered on or
before the dismissal date mandated by section 263.401.113 Otherwise,
the court opined, the mandatory dismissal provision is meaningless. 5 4
Moreover, the court held that when several children are removed
from a home, the dismissal date mandated under section 263.401 must
be based on the separate orders appointing temporary conservatorship to DPRS despite consolidation of the suits.1 55 Furthermore, a
trial court may not dismiss the suit in less than twelve months because,
under section 263.401, the legislature
intended to give DPRS twelle
1 56
months to achieve permanency.
In re Ruiz' 5 7 addressed whether a signed docket notation constituted a final order. 15 8 At the termination hearing, the judge made a
docket notation stating: "[d]ecree of termination to be entered as to
both parents per jury's verdict. ' 159 Although the termination hearing
was held prior to the twelve-month deadline, the judge failed to enter
a final order until one month past the deadline. 6 0
Under section 101.026,61 pronouncement of a court's ruling may be
done "in writing, including on the court's docket sheet or by a separate written instrument.' 62 However, section 263.401(d) specifically
defines a final order 163 for purposes of section 263.401, and the court
held that it controlled over section 101.026.164 The docket notation
was not sufficient to terminate parental rights, and it failed to appoint
a managing conservator for the child as mandated under section
263.401(d). 165 Therefore, the court held that the docket notation was
1 66
not a final order.
Next, the court defended its ruling against DPRS's claim that it produced an absurd result. 1 67 The court reasoned that such a result was
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
8 S.W.3d 412, 418-21 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.).
Id. at 419.
Id.
Id. at 420-21.
Id. at 420.
16 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.).
Id. at 923.
Id. at 924.
See id. at 923.

161.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id. § 263.401.
Ruiz, 16 S.W.3d at 924.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 927.

§ 101.026 (Vernon 2002).
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68
not absurd because the dismissal did not have res judicata effect.1
DPRS could refile the suit based on the same grounds, but it could not
keep the child "in foster care absent new facts supporting" the need
for removal. 6 9 In the court's opinion, allowing the child to stay in
DPRS's care absent new facts would circumvent the intent of section
263.401.1° The court explained that such a ruling would allow DPRS
to avoid the sanctions of the deadline and to "maintain custody
of a
1 71
child in its care indefinitely merely by annually refiling suit."'
The next issue considered by an appellate court was whether the
parties to a suit brought by DPRS to terminate the parent-child relationship could execute a Rule 11 agreement 172 and avoid the effects of
section 263.401.173 The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that section
263.401 requires dismissal "once the time lapses," regardless of what
the parties desire. 1 74 Holding that a "Rule 11 agreement [was] nothing more than a contract," the court declared it unenforceable as it
attempted to bypass the time restrictions of section 263.401(a). 7 5
In re M.C.M. 176 resolved the conflict between the mandatory dismissal date in section 263.401 and the indefinite continuance under
section 161.2011.177 At the time of the appeal, section 161.2011178 required that a termination suit be continued when pending criminal
1 79
charges exist relating to the grounds on which termination is based.
Such a continuance lasts until the criminal charges are resolved, with
the court having discretion
to proceed to final trial if it is in the best
180
interest of the child.
Relying on the intent of the statutes, the court held that section
161.2011 should stay section 263.401.181 The court opined that section
161.2011 should act to stay the eighteen-month deadline of section

168. See id.
169. Id. (citing In re Bishop, 8 S.W.3d 412, 420 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.);
Slatton v. Brazoria County Protective Servs. Unit, 804 S.W.2d 550, 552-53 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ)).
170. See id. These new facts warranting removal must have occurred after the adversary hearing in which DPRS was appointed temporary managing conservator. Id.
171. Id.
172. A Rule 11 agreement is simply an agreement made between attorneys or parties concerning a pending suit. The agreement must be in writing, signed, and filed in
the record to be enforceable. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
173. See In re T.M., 33 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
174. Id. at 346.
175. Id. at 347.
176. 57 S.W.3d 27 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
177. See id. at 35-37.
178. Act of May 31, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1022, § 61, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3733,
3759, amended by Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, § 3, 2001 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2395, 2395 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2011 (Vernon
2002)).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. M.C.M., 57 S.W.3d at 36.
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263.401.182 According to the court, the termination suit would automatically be stayed and the time limits tolled until the criminal trial is
resolved.' l 3 Upon resolution of the criminal charges, the deadline
under section 263.401 would continue to run.18" If the trial judge did
not find it in the child's best interest to await resolution, the stay could
be lifted.18 5

The mandatory dismissal deadline was an impressive attempt to
eliminate foster care limbo. However, the interpretation and compliimance problems discussed in this Part revealed the need for further
18 6
provements to section 263.401 and the permanency process.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT VERSION OF SECTION

263.401

In 2001, the Seventy-Seventh Legislature passed several amendments to the Texas Family Code clarifying the requirements of section
263.401 and eliminating the contradictory language in other statutes.1 87 Most of these changes address the issues addressed by the
appellate courts in Part 111.188 This Part discusses and analyzes these

amendments.
A.

Dismissal Deadline of Twelve Months

The amendments to section 263.401189 clarified the extension provi-

sions in its subsections (b) and (c).' 9 ° Now, if the court wants to retain
a suit on its docket beyond the mandatory dismissal date, the court

182. Id. at 37.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 137-85.
187. See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2395.
188. Compare id., with supra text accompanying notes 135-85.
189. See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, § 8, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws
2395, 2396.
190. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401 (Vernon 2002). This section provides in relevant part:
(b) The court may retain the suit on the court's docket for a period not to
exceed 180 days after the time described by Subsection (a), if the court
finds that continuing the appointment of the department as temporary
managing conservator is in the best interest of the child. If the court
retains the suit on the court's docket, the court shall render an order in
which the court:
(1) schedules the new date for dismissal of the suit not later than the
180th day after the time described by Subsection (a);
(2) makes further temporary orders for the safety and welfare of the
child as necessary to avoid further delay in resolving the suit; and
(3) sets a final hearing on a date that allows the court to render a final
order before the required date for dismissal of the suit under this
subsection.
(c) If the court grants an extension but does not render a final order or
dismiss the suit on or before the required date for dismissal under Subsection (b), the court shall dismiss the suit. The court may not grant an

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

17

TexasTEXAS
WesleyanWESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.LAW
9 [2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 5
REVIEW

[Vol. 9

must find that the continued appointment of DPRS "as temporary
managing conservator is in the best interest of the child."' 91 Then, the
court must render an order that schedules the new dismissal date "not
later than the 180th day after the time described by subsection (a),"
and "sets a final hearing on a date that allows the court to render a
final order before the required date for dismissal."'1 92 Additionally,
"[t]he court may not grant an additional extension" beyond the 180day extension permitted by subsection (b). 93 Various word replacements make it clear that an extension may not exceed 180 days from
the original dismissal date under subsection (a); 194 if an extension is
granted, the court must enter an order meeting the requirements of
subsection (b). 19 5
The legislature enacted a new provision in section 263.304196 to ensure compliance with section 263.401.'9' Under subsection (b), the

court must schedule the final hearing at the initial permanency hearing,198 and the final hearing date must comply with the dismissal date
under section 263.401(a).1 99 Before this subsection's addition, no pro-

vision required the court to take such actions. 200 Furthermore, if the
court does not comply with subsection (b), any party to the suit may
seek mandamus. °1
These amendments reduce the chance of a dismissal under section
263.401.202 Six months after DPRS is named temporary managing
conservator, the court is required to set a final hearing date that complies with section 263.401.203 If the court fails to do so, the parties
additional extension that extends the suit beyond the required date for
dismissal under Subsection (b).
Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. In addition, this order should also make any temporary orders necessary
for the safety and welfare of the child. Id.
193. Id. § 263.401(c).
194. Id. § 263.401(b)(1).
195. Id. § 263.401(b)(1)-(3).
196. See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2395

(current version at

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

197. See id.
198. TEX. FAM. CODE
199. Id.

200.

SAMPSON

ANN.

§ 263.304).

§ 263.304(b).

& TINDALL'S, supra note 33, § 263.304 cmt.

201. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.304(b).
202. Because the final hearing must be scheduled to comply with section 263.401, a
final order will be rendered within twelve months of DPRS's appointment as temporary managing conservator. See id. If the court reschedules a hearing date that does
not comply with section 263.401(a), "[a]ny party to the suit" may seek mandamus. Id.
§ 263.304. Only if the court grants an extension under section 263.401(b) will there be
an opportunity for the final order not to be rendered in compliance with section
263.401(a). See id. § 263.401(a), (b).
203. See id. § 263.304. Under section 263.304(a), the initial permanency hearing
must be held no later than the 180th day from the date the court renders a temporary
order, and section 263.304(b) requires the final hearing date be set. Id.
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have an immediate recourse of seeking mandamus.2 °4 Under section
263.304(b), the dismissal date provision will be met unless the court
later postpones the scheduled hearing date.2 °5
1. Conflict Between Sections 161.2011 and 263.401
The Legislature amended section 161.2011 to eliminate the conflict
with section 263.401.206 Under section 161.2011, a continuance is no
longer mandatory. In fact, the court may only grant such a continuance at the parent's request and only if it is in the child's best interest.2 7 Even if the court grants a continuance, status and permanency
hearings must be conducted as required under Chapter 263 of the
Texas Family Code 20 ' and the time limitation of section 263.401 is not
stayed. 20 9 Therefore, unlike a continuance under the previous version
of section 161.2011, a continuance may not postpone the2 10final hearing
beyond eighteen months from the initiation of the suit.
These changes are consistent with the State's intent of reducing a
child's stay in foster care. 211thWhen the grounds for termination are
also the basis for criminal prosecution against the parent, resolution 212
of
the criminal case may be helpful in resolving the termination suit;
however, the additional benefit of the resolution is outweighed by the
harm caused to a child who lingers in foster care.21 3 Although a possibility exists that a criminal suit may not be resolved within the dismissal provisions of section 263.401, the possibility is minute.21 4 Despite a
204. Id.
205. The hearing date is already set before the twelve-month deadline of section
263.401(a), and the court must schedule the date to allow time for a full trial. See id.
Therefore, a final order will be rendered before the deadline unless the court
postpones the hearing. Id.
206. See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, § 3, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws
2395 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2011).
207. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2011(a) (Vernon 2002).
208. Id.; see id. ch. 263.
209. See id. § 161.2011(a).
210. Compare Act of May 31, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1022, § 61, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3733, 3759, with Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, § 3, 2001 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2395. If the court finds it in the best interest of the child, an extension
order may be granted to allow more time for resolution of the criminal trial. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b). This provision allows for an additional six months.
Id.
211. See Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at Tape 1, Side A (statement of Sen. Florence Shapiro). This amendment will prevent a termination suit from being postponed indefinitely and allow DPRS to achieve permanency quickly.
212. See In re M.C.M., 57 S.W.3d 27, 36-37 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001,
pet. denied).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 10-17 (discussing effects of foster care on
children).
214. This assertion is based on the Author's experience with the criminal justice
system and the assumption that an extension granted to allow more time for resolution of the criminal case is in the child's best interest.
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backlogged court system, most criminal cases are resolved within eighteen months.215
2.

Rule 11 Agreements

With the enactment of Chapter 1090 of the Act of May 22, 2001, the
parties may not enter a Rule 11 agreement to avoid the mandatory

dismissal under section 263.401.216 The statute clearly states that parties to a DPRS suit may not enter into an agreement to extend the
deadlines beyond the requirements of Subchapter E.2 17 The prohibi-

tion is in the best interest of all foster-care children, because such use

of a Rule 11 agreement would render the provision's deadline
meaningless.2 18

3. Waiver of the Time Limitation
The legislature included a provision in section 263.402219 creating a
waiver of the mandatory dismissal under section 263.401.220 A motion
to dismiss the suit for noncompliance with section 263.401 must be
timely, or the right to object is waived. 22 ' A timely motion is one
made prior to the close of DPRS's evidence at a trial on the merits. 222
Thus, contrary to the Ruiz holding,223 a party will be unsuccessful in
raising the court's failure to comply with the mandatory dismissal date
after a final order has been rendered.2 2 4 This amendment was necessary because parents had been using the mandatory dismissal as a
'225
"filibustering tactic.

B.

Effect of a Dismissal Under Section 263.401

Due to the confusion that existed over whether a dismissal of a petition under section 263.401 had res judicata effect,22 6 the legislature
215. This assertion is based on the Author's experience with the criminal justice
system.
216. See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, § 9, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws
2395 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.402(a) (Vernon 2002)).
217. Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.402.
218. Through a Rule 11 agreement, the parties could postpone the case at their
whim leaving a child's permanency in limbo. Section 263.401 was enacted to prevent
children from lingering in foster care; thus this amendment is in the best interest of
the child.
219. TEX.FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.402.
220. See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, § 9, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws
2395 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.402).
221. See id.
222. Id. This does not include rebuttal evidence. Id.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 157-71.
224. See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2395
(current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.402).
225. E-mail from Leslie A. Fox, Regional Attorney, Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, to Sherry Hess, Texas Wesleyan University School of
Law (Feb. 8, 2002, 15:32:26 CST) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
226. See SAMPSON & TINDALL'S, supra note 33, § 161.203 cmt., § 161.205 cmt.
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amended section 161.203.227 The amendment clearly states that a dismissal is without prejudice.2 28 Thus, a dismissal under the above section would not prevent DPRS from refiling on the same grounds.2 2 9
Only an order denying a petition for termination has res judicata effect.23 ° Such an order must be entered if the court does not terminate
the parent-child relationship, unless the court renders another order
in the best interest of the child.23 1
The legislature was correct in not applying res judicata to a dismissal
under section 263.401. Res judicata applies only when there has been
a final decision on the merits. When the case has been dismissed
under section 263.401, no decision has been made on the merits.2 3 2
Upon dismissal of a petition under section 263.401, a child in
DPRS's custody must be returned to his or her parents.2 3 3 Although
DPRS may refile a petition on the same grounds, a child can only be
removed from his or her parents' custody if DPRS presents new facts
proving that the child is in danger. 234 "New facts" are those events
that have occurred after the adversary hearing in which the court first
granted removal. 235 The fact that parents have not alleviated their
problems, which236were grounds for the first suit, is not enough to constitute a "risk.

Although a judge's own subjective values may influence a finding of
"risk" to justify removal,23 7 the requirement of "new facts" prevents
DPRS from simply refiling petitions after dismissal under section
263.401. Unfortunately, foster-care children will not differentiate between the time spent in foster care prior to dismissal and the time
allowed under the new petition. They will be aware of the continued
intrusion into the parent-child relationship and will likely suffer anxiety over the uncertain future and possible separation from their parents again.2 38
227. See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, § 4, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws
2395 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.203).
228. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.203.
229. See In re Bishop, 8 S.W.3d 412, 420 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.); In re
Ruiz, 16 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.).
230. Ruiz, 16 S.W.3d at 927; see Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 603,
§§ 5-12, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2120-23.
231. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.205.
232. A dismissal under section 263.401 is based solely on the court's failure to enter
a final order by the required dismissal date of this section. The dismissal is not based
on any findings against or in support of the petition filed by DPRS.
233. See Ruiz, 16 S.W.3d at 927.
234. See id.

235. Id.
236. See E-mail from Leslie A. Fox, supra note 225.

237. Id.
238. See

WARZYNSKI,

supra note 88, at 765.
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C. Appeals of a Final Order
The legislature addressed the role of appeals in delaying a child's
permanency through the enactment of section 263.405.239 A party
who intends to appeal an order terminating the parent-child relationship must file a statement of the points of appeal with the trial court
not later than fifteen days after the date the final order was signed. 2 40
This accelerated-appeals process,2 4' in conjunction with section
109.002,242 decreases the uncertainty surrounding the final order.2" 3
Section 109.002 gives appeals of DPRS's termination suits precedence
over other civil appeals cases.24 4 Additionally, the court is not allowed to suspend an order that terminates the parent-child relationship.2 45 These provisions prevent an appeal from causing further
disruption in a child's life.2 46
V.

PROPOSALS

According to the statistics, the mandatory dismissal under section
263.401 has been successful in decreasing a child's foster care stay
prior to termination.247 However, the deadline may not always work
in the best interest of the child: the deadline may act to prematurely
terminate the parent-child relationship of a parent with a chemical
dependency.248 In addition, the legislature has failed to establish a
deadline for cases remanded on appeal.249 These problems and the
proposed resolutions to these problems will be discussed in the following sections.
A.

Amend Section 263.401 to Allow an Extension When the Parent
Receives Substance Abuse Treatment

Although the maximum time of eighteen months is sufficient in
most cases to determine if the parent can resolve his or her problems,
239. See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1090, § 9, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws
2395 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405 (Vernon 2002)).
240. TEX.

FAM.

CODE ANN.

§ 263.405(b).

241. Id. § 263.405(a).
242. Id. § 109.002.
243. The uncertainty over whether the trial court's judgment will be overturned is
decreased because the time period to file an appeal has been shortened, and appellate
courts must hear such an appeal quickly. See id. §§ 109.002, 263.405.
244. Id. §§ 109.002(a), 263.405.
245. Id. § 109.002(c).
246. A child's placement under the trial court's final order cannot be disturbed. Id.
Thus, a child will not be moved between his parents and DPRS while awaiting an
appellate decision. Id.
247. See DESCRIPION, supra note 8 (stating that DPRS had approximately 8000
children in temporary custody as of January 1, 1998, and all but 220 of those children
had their cases dismissed or final orders rendered); see also Press Release, supra note
28.
248. See infra text accompanying notes 250-61.
249. See infra text accompanying notes 262-79.
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circumstances exist in which more than eighteen months may be
needed.
These circumstances include when a parent has a substance abuse problem.2 5 a This problem very likely inhibits a parent's
efforts toward addressing and meeting all of the service plan requirements.2 52 Consequently, the possibility exists that a parent-child relationship may be terminated prematurely.2 5 3 Because these
circumstances "effectively shorten[ ] their real time to work the [ser254
vice] plan to the point where it's not possible to meet the deadline,
a provision should be enacted to allow an extension to give parents in
such a situation more time.
An extension would only be granted based on the court's finding
that the parent received inpatient or outpatient treatment under an
appropriate treatment facility for chemical addictions. By limiting it
to a treatment facility, parents could not attempt to extend the deadline based on self-induced treatment. The party requesting the extension would have the burden of proving the following three elements:
(1) that a chemical addiction exists, (2) that this addiction impaired
their ability to fulfill the requirements of the service plan, and (3) that
treatment was received at an appropriate treatment facility. In addition, a court would be required to find reasonable cause that the child
will be reunified with the parent. This would prevent needless delay
when the parent receives treatment but the grounds for termination
are either serious or the parent has not made a "good faith" effort at
reunification.25 5 The proposed amendment to section 263.401 is as
follows:
(c) An additional extension may be granted under subsection (b)
(1) ifthe court finds that:
(a) the parent suffers from a chemical addiction;
(b) the parent has received treatment at an appropriate
treatment facility for a length of time to impair their
ability to meet the goals of the service plan and
(c) reasonable cause exists that the child may be reunified
with the parent.
(2) the burden of proof rests on the party requesting the
extension;
(3) an extension granted under this subsection may not last
longer than 180 days.
250. E-mail from Leslie A. Fox, supra note 225.
251. Id.
252. Id. If a parent has a chemical addiction or a mental health problem, receiving
treatment to resolve those illnesses will be required under his or her service plan. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

253.
254.
255.
solved

§§ 161.001(1)(P), 263.102(a)(7) (Vernon 2002).

See Hort, supra note 43, at 1914.
E-mail from Leslie A. Fox, supra note 225.
For example, if the parent has multiple problems that are not likely to be reby treatment, there would be no need to extend the dismissal date.
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Current subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) would be reworded and re-

numbered accordingly.
Although this amendment may slow the process of moving children

through foster care,2 56 the statistics prove that it is needed. The percentage of child abuse and neglect cases involving parents with chemical addictions has been increasing.25 7 Addicts seeking treatment may
encounter waiting lists. 25 8 In 1998, a mere ten percent of child welfare
agencies were able to find treatment programs for needy parents
within thirty days.2 5 9 Additionally, drug treatment may last up to one
year. 260 With the potential for successful drug treatment,2 6 ' this
amendment could keep otherwise destroyed Texas families intact.
B.

Create a Time Limit for Disposition of Cases Remanded
After Appeal

Even though the legislature enacted a statute for speedy appeals
and temporary orders during an appeal, 262 they have failed to regulate
the disposition of a case after an appeal. 263 This has resulted in some
confusion surrounding the handling of a case after appeal.2 64 Does

the trial court operate under another deadline? If so, how much time
does the court have to enter a final order?
Although the disposition of an appealed case would depend on the
appellate court's judgment, the trial court's docket, and the particular
facts of the case,2 65 180 days should be ample time to dispose of any
case. On appeal, if the appellate court finds merit in an issue raised, it
can either reverse a trial court's holding or reverse and remand the
256. This amendment would grant an additional extension to the one currently allowed, making the maximum time spent in foster care twenty-four months rather than
eighteen. The Author admits that this amendment would have the effect of lengthening a child's stay in foster care. However, it is the Author's belief that, in this situation, the harm caused by termination of a parent-child relationship that could have
been rehabilitated outweighs the additional harm caused by a lengthier stay.
257. See Hort, supra note 43, at 1914 (discussing the prevalence of drug-addicted
parents); see also O'Flynn, supra note 50, at 243-46.
258. See O'Flynn, supra note 50, at 260-61. In 1997, 52,000 people were on waiting
lists for substance abuse programs. Id.
259. Id. at 261.
260. Id. at 258.
261. Id. at 263. One-third are successful on the first attempt and success is more
likely for those who remain in the treatment program for longer periods of time. Id.
262. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 109.001-.002, 263.405 (Vernon 2002).
263. See id. § 263.405; see also id. ch. 263, subch. E.
264. The Author witnessed such confusion personally during the Summer of 2001.
A trial court's order terminating a mother's parental rights was reversed by the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals. Upon remand, the trial judge was confused as to how much
time he had to enter a new order. The attorney ad litem argued that the time limit
started over but could not support his opinion with case law. The judge finally ordered the child stay in DPRS's custody and circumvented the issue.
265. These factors will affect whether a new trial will be held, a new petition filed,
the possibility of a settlement agreement, and so forth.
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case for a new trial.2 66 If the court reverses a final order that terminated a parent-child relationship, the reversal is equal to a denial of
the petition. 26 7 Because the petition was in effect denied, DPRS
would have to file a new petition based on new facts,2 68 and the re2 69
quirements of section 263.401 would apply.
But if the appellate court reverses and remands the case for a new
trial, the trial court must hold a new trial unless the parties reach an
agreement on their own.270 Because a final order has been rendered,
section 263.401 no longer applies to the remanded case. 27 ' The court
has no other deadline by which it must abide.2 72 Considering that trial
courts have been resistant in complying with the mandatory provisions
of section 263.401,273 the possibility exists that they will not dispose of
these cases in a timely manner on their own initiative. 7 4
Although the parties may normally dispose of the case either
through settlement or dismissal, a statute should be enacted to ensure
that the permanency of a child is not needlessly delayed. The legislature should enact a statute to allow the trial court and parties 180 days
to enter a final order. This timeframe allows the parties ample time to
prepare their case for another trial or to reach an agreement. 275 The
discovery process has already taken place; therefore, the parties are
familiar with the case.276 The parties would have ample time to review the appellate court's judgment and identify the strengths and
weaknesses of their case.2 77 This timeframe also allows the trial court
flexibility in working the case into its docket. 278 The trial court should
have few problems meeting the requirements of such a statute because 9the court already gives preferential court settings to DPRS
27
suits.

A statute limiting the time allowed for disposition of an appealed
case could be structured as follows:
Entering a Final Order After an Appeal
266. TEX. R. App. P. 43.2.
267. See In re Ruiz, 16 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.); see TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.205.
268. See Ruiz, 16 S.W.3d at 927.
269. See id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401.
270. Ruiz, 16 S.W.3d at 927.
271. E-mail from Leslie A. Fox, supra note 225.
272. See id.; see also E-mail from Sarah R. Guidry, Regional Attorney, Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, to Sherry Hess, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law (Feb. 12, 2002, 13:01:24 CST) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan
Law Review).
273. See E-mail from Sarah R. Guidry, supra note 272; see also supra text accompanying notes 135-86.
274. See E-mail from Sarah R. Guidry, supra note 272.
275. E-mail from Leslie A. Fox, supra note 225.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
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(A) If the final order entered by the trial court in a suit affecting
the parent-child relationship, filed by the department, was appealed and the appellate court reversed and remanded for a
new trial,
(1) the trial court shall enter a new final order within 180 days
of the date of the appellate court's decision, and
(B) If the trial court fails to comply with subsection (A)(1) and the
suit has not been dismissed, the court shall dismiss the suit.
This proposal would ensure that a case remanded on appeal would not
linger indefinitely. Furthermore, it provides a sufficient amount of
time for a final order to be rendered.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The State of Texas has taken a step in the right direction toward
eliminating foster care limbo by enacting Texas Family Code section
263.401 and its companion statutes. However, when a parent has a
substance abuse problem, the mandatory dismissal deadline may work
against the best interest of the child. Additionally, the legislature has
neglected to apply a deadline to remanded cases, leaving a gap in the
system. Implementing the proposals in the preceding Part will help
ensure that termination is truly in the best interest of the child.
Sherry A. Hess
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